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Cooperative games and pseudo-Boolean functions
Cooperative games
The set of players : N = {1, . . . , n}. Game : f : 2N → R. For a coalition
S of players f (S) is the worth of S (usually f (∅) = 0, not additive).
Pseudo-Boolean functions
These are functions f : {0, 1}n → R.
We identify S ⊆ N and 1S ∈ {0, 1}n, for example
S = {2, 4} ⊂ N = {1, 2, 3, 4} 7→ 1S = (0, 1, 0, 1).
So, games are pseudo-Boolean functions. Such functions can be written
f (x) =
∑
S⊆N
f (S)
∏
i∈S
xi
∏
i∈N\S
(1− xi) =
∑
S⊆N
a(S)
∏
i∈S
xi .
Multilinear extensions (Owen,1972)
f¯ : [0, 1]n → R : x 7→
∑
S⊆N
a(S)
∏
i∈S
xi .
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Power indexes
Problem : Find the real influence/power of a player on the game (to
share the benefits, or simply to analyze the game).
The Shapley power index (L.S. Shapley 1953):
φSh(f , i) =
∑
T 63i
(n − t − 1)!t!
n! ∆
i f (T ),
where
∆i f (T ) = f (T ∪ i)− f (T \ i)
is the discrete derivative of f with respect to i at T .
The Banzhaf power index (J. Banzhaf 1965):
φB(f , i) =
1
2n−1
∑
T 63i
∆i f (T ).
There exist many axiomatic characterizations.
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Interaction indexes I
Problem : The influence of a pair of players i , j is not the sum of their
respective powers because of the interactions. Here we review concepts
of interactions.
The Banzhaf interaction index (Owen (1972), Murofushi-Soneda (1993))
IB(f , {i , j}) = 12n−2
∑
T⊂N\{i,j}
(f (T ∪ ij)− f (T ∪ i)− f (T ∪ j) + f (T )).
Note that, for T ⊆ N \ {i , j},
∆ij f (T ) = f (T ∪ ij)− f (T ∪ i)− f (T ∪ j) + f (T )
= (f (T ∪ ij)− f (T ))− (f (T ∪ i)− f (T ))− (f (T ∪ j)− f (T ))
= (f (T ∪ ij)− f (T ∪ j))− (f (T ∪ i)− f (T )).
For f (x) =
∑
T⊆N a(T )
∏
i∈T xi and S ⊆ N,
∆S f (x) =
∑
T⊇S
a(T )
∏
i∈T\S
xi
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Interaction indexes II
To measure the interaction among players in coalition S:
The Banzhaf interaction index of S (Roubens (1996))
IB(f ,S) =
1
2n−s
∑
T⊂N\S
∆S f (T ).
The Shapley interaction index of S (Grabisch (1997))
ISh(f ,S) =
∑
T⊂N\S
(n − t − s)!t!
(n − s + 1)! ∆
S f (T ).
Probabilistic interaction index of S (Grabisch,Roubens, see also Fujimoto,
Kojadinovic, Marichal (2006))
I(f ,S) =
∑
T⊂N\S
pST∆S f (T ),
with pST > 0 and
∑
T pST = 1. Expected values of derivatives.
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Alternative expressions of interactions
Expressions in terms of the Mo¨bius transform
IB(f ,S) =
∑
T⊇S
(
1
2
)t−s
a(T ),
ISh(f ,S) =
∑
T⊇S
1
t − s + 1 a(T ).
In terms of the derivatives of the Owen extension f¯
IB(f ,S) = (DS f¯ )(
1
2 , . . . ,
1
2 ) =
∫
[0,1]n
DS f¯ (x) dx,
ISh(f ,S) =
∫
[0,1]
DS f¯ (x , . . . , x) dx .
We will interpret these integrals at the end of the talk.
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Main properties
Alternative representations
The map f 7→ (IB(f ,S) : S ⊆ N) is a linear bijection :
f¯ (x) =
∑
S⊆N
IB(f ,S)
∏
i∈S
(
xi − 12
)
.
Symmetry-anonymity
If pi ∈ Sn and pi(f )(x1, . . . , xn) = f (xpi(1), . . . , xpi(n)), then
I(pi(f ), pi(S)) = I(f ,S).
Dummy players
A player i is dummy in f if f (T ∪ i) = f (T ) + f (i)− f (∅) for T ⊆ N \ i .
If i is dummy, then
I(f , i) = f (i)− f (∅) and I(f ,S) = 0 ∀S 3 i ,S 6= {i}.
Some axiomatic characterizations use these properties.
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Banzhaf power index and linear model
Rmk :If `(x) = `∅ + `1x1 + · · ·+ `nxn, we have IB(`, i) = `i .
Alternative definition of a power index
Given a pseudo-Boolean f , consider a linear model for f :
f1(x) = a∅ + a1x1 + · · ·+ anxn
Define the power of i in f by ai .
Least squares method : find f1 that minimizes∑
x∈{0,1}n
(f (x)− g(x))2
among all linear models g .
Note that this means that all the coalitions are on the same footing.
Theorem (Hammer-Holzman (1992))
In the solution of the least squares problem, ai = IB(f , i).
Note that we could have used the model f1,i(x) = a∅ + aixi .
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Banzhaf interaction index and multi-linear model
The setting
Vk : space of pseudo-Boolean functions of degree k at most
Vk = {g : g(x) =
∑
S⊆N,s6k
c(S)
∏
i∈S
xi}.
For each f , find fk ∈ Vk that minimizes
∑
x∈{0,1}n(f (x)− g(x))2 among
all g ∈ Vk .
Theorem (Grabisch-Marichal-Roubens (2000))
We have fk =
∑
s6k ak(S)
∏
i∈S xi with
ak(S) = a(S) + (−1)k−s
∑
T⊇S,t>k
(
t − s − 1
k − s
)(1
2
)t−s
a(T ).
as(S) = IB(f ,S) (!).
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The new recipe
To compute IB(f ,S)
• Look at the cardinality of S: s = |S|;
• Find the best approximation of f by a function of degree at most s;
• Collect the coefficient of this approximation along the monomial∏
i∈S xi in this approximation.
Remarks :
1 The function x 7→∏i∈S xi is the unanimity function w.r.t. S.
2 In this setting, all the coalitions are on the same footing, they are
equally likely to form.
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Weighted least squares
w(S) : the probability that coalition S forms : w(S) = Pr(C = S).
Under independence
pi = Pr(C 3 i) =
∑
S3i w(S) ∈ (0, 1) and
w(S) =
∏
i∈S
pi
∏
i∈N\S
(1− pi).
Associated weighted least squares problem
Find the unique fk ∈ Vk that minimizes the (squared) distance∑
x∈{0,1}n
w(x)
(
f (x)− g(x))2 = ∑
S⊆N
w(S)
(
f (S)− g(S))2
among all functions g ∈ Vk .
Rmk : The distance is associated to the inner product
〈f , g〉 = ∑x∈{0,1}n w(x)f (x)g(x), and w is defined by p = (p1, . . . , pn).
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First solution of the least squares problem
The use of independence Guoli Ding et al (2010)
Bk = {vS : S ⊆ N, s 6 k}, where vS : {0, 1}n → R is given by
vS(x) =
∏
i∈S
xi − pi√
pi(1− pi)
=
∑
T⊆S
∏
i∈S\T (−pi)∏
i∈S
√
pi(1− pi)
∏
i∈T
xi
forms an orthonormal basis for Vk .
The projection
fk =
∑
T⊆N
t6k
〈f , vT 〉 vT .
The index
IB,p(f ,S) =
〈f , vS〉∏
i∈S
√
pi(1− pi)
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First properties
The index characterizes the projection :
fk ∈ Vk is the best kth approximation of f iff
IB,p(f ,S) = IB,p(fk ,S) ∀S : s 6 k.
(Hint : this is equivalent to 〈f , vS〉 = 〈fk , vS〉.)
The map f 7→ IB,p(f ,S) is linear.
The map f 7→ (IB,p(f ,S) : S ⊆ N) is a bijection
fk(x) =
∑
T⊆N,t6k
IB,p(f ,T )
∏
i∈T
(xi − pi), k = n (!)
The index and the multilinear extension of f :
IB,p(f ,S) = (DS f¯ )(p)
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Explicit formulas
From f (x) =
∑
T⊆N a(T )
∏
i∈T xi
Explicit expression of the index
IB,p(f ,S) =
∑
T⊇S
a(T )
∏
i∈T\S
pi
Proof : Just compute the derivatives of f¯ .
Explicit expression of the approximation
fk(x) =
∑
S⊆N,s6k ak(S)
∏
i∈S xi
ak(S) = a(S) + (−1)k−s
∑
T⊇S,t>k
(
t − s − 1
k − t
)( ∏
i∈T\S
pi
)
a(T )
Proof : Use expression of fk and IB,p(f ,S), expand and do some algebra.
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The index as an expected value
An expected value of the discrete derivative
IB,p(f ,S) = E (∆S f ) =
∑
x∈{0,1}n
w(x) ∆S f (x).
Proof : Use ∆S f (x) =
∑
T⊇S a(T )
∏
i∈T\S xi , independence and explicit
formula for IB,p(f ,S).
An average (As a probabilistic interaction index)
IB,p(f ,S) =
∑
T⊆N\S
pST (∆S f )(T ),
where pST = Pr(T ⊆ C ⊆ S ∪ T ) =
∏
i∈T pi
∏
i∈(N\(S∪T ))(1− pi).
Interpretation : pST = Pr(C = S ∪ T | C ⊇ S) = Pr(C = T | C ⊆ N \ S)
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Further properties
Null players
A player i is null for f if f (T ∪ i) = f (T ) for all T ⊆ N \ i .
If S contains a null player then IB,p(f ,S) = 0.
Dummy coalitions
D ⊆ N is dummy for f if f (T ) = f (T ∩ D) + f (T ∩ (N \ D))− f (∅) for
every T ⊆ N.
If D is dummy for f , if K ∩ D 6= ∅ and K \ D 6= ∅ : IB,p(f ,K ) = 0.
Symmetry of the index
An index I is symmetric if I(pi(f ), pi(S)) = I(f ,S) for all permutations pi.
IB,p is symmetric if and only w or is symmetric i.e. p1 = · · · = pn.
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Back to Banzhaf and Shapley
A link with the Banzhaf index
IB,p′(f ,S) =
∑
T⊇S
IB,p(f ,T )
∏
i∈T\S
(p′i − pi), set pi or p′i to 12 (!)
Another link with the Banzhaf index
IB(f ,S) =
∫
[0,1]n
DS f¯ (p)d p =
∫
[0,1]n
IB,p(f ,S) dp
Proof : Just use explicit expressions and integrate.
Interpretation : take an average over p if it is not known.
A link with the Shapley index
ISh(f ,S) =
∫ 1
0
DS f¯ (p, . . . , p) dp =
∫ 1
0
IB,(p,...,p)(f ,S) dp.
Interpretation : average if the players behave in the same (unknown) way.
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